KC-30 team swift boats General Handy

KC-30 team’s July 11th entry in its “Tanker Truths” series attempts to portray retired USAF General John W. Handy as a flip-flopper on the tanker contract battle in the wake of his July 7th, 2008 Human Events article that details his support for the smaller Boeing tanker.

The central thesis of KC-30 team’s attack is based on their selectively edited quote of Gen. Handy from an August 3rd, 2005 article published in Aviation Week:

"In my humble opinion, the greatest need is a little more strategic-capable aircraft...I'm saying that the need is more in the KC-10-like aircraft."

We’ll sum up our points countering the KC-30 smear, and for those of you who want to delve deeper, we have included many of the links to General Handy’s tanker statements over the years:

First, the 2005 quote that the KC-30 team utilizes demonstrates nothing more than Gen. Handy’s preference that, in addition to replacing the KC-135Es, he also sees a need for more strategic KC-10-like tankers. Gen. Handy could be accused of carrying on the fine tradition of lobbying for more equipment for his pilots and Airmen, but not flip-flopping.

Second, the statement is essentially irrelevant to the current tanker battle, for in its Request for Proposal, the United States Air Force clearly outlined that the competition was for the sole purpose of finding a replacement for the KC-135 tankers. The only argument anyone can validly make using Gen. Handy’s words is that the Air Force was wrong in its decision to replace the KC-135 instead of the first getting more KC-10-like tankers.

Third, the insinuation that the KC-30 is a more strategic-capable aircraft like the KC-10 is just wrong. While the KC-30, as well as the KC-767, can carry more fuel than the KC-135, all these tankers fall far short of the refueling capabilities of the KC-10. (KC-10 w/356,000 lbs of fuel vs. KC-30 w/245,000 lbs of fuel)

Fourth, KC-30 team intentionally manipulates Gen. Handy’s quote in a way that drastically alters its meaning. The actual quote and passage from the Aviation Week article:

"In my humble opinion, the greatest need is a little more strategic-capable aircraft because we do have the R-model 135 to last for many more years," Handy told The DAILY Aug. 2. "I'm saying that the need is more in the KC-10-like aircraft."

Handy said he also favors replacing the KC-135 fleet but would do that after acquiring more strategic tankers. He said "the nation doesn't have an unlimited supply of dollars, and so you have to sequence these acquisitions as best as you possibly can."

From this full quote and passage you easily see Gen. Handy’s thinking. 1) Get more KC-10 type tankers, [Note: these new strategic tankers would not be replacements since the KC-10s are in good working order] 2) Replace the KC-135 Es. 3) Replace the rest of the KC-135 Fleet. As you can see, he qualifies all this by suggesting budget factors play a part in the sequencing.

Fifth, below we have listed other statements Gen. Handy has made on the tanker issue. It is worth noting that not once, in any of these articles, does Gen. Handy say anything that contradicts the statements in his Human Events article or the Aviation Week interview.

The only difference is that in the Aviation Week interview Gen. Handy adds that, in addition to the other tanker needs, he also sees the need for “more KC-10-like aircraft.” This is not a contradiction, but his view of procurement priorities at that time. It, as we have stated before, was also a nice bit of lobbying for more strategic tankers in addition to replacements for the KC-135Es that he was assured of getting.

Nowhere does he suggest the KC-10 fleet needs to be replaced, that the Airbus tanker is a more strategic tanker, or that the Airbus tanker would be a better solution to any of the tanker procurement issues he faced.

The KC-30 team wants you to believe their spin version in which Gen. Handy is flip-flopper and you should ignore everything he has said over a long history of testimony, articles, and speeches. We instead believe that you, the informed Tanker War Blog reader, should be the judge of Gen. Handy’s views.

In closing, we have noticed that several KC-30 supporters have attempted to insinuate that Gen Handy was somehow nefariously involved in the "tanker-lease scandal" because he sent, received or was CC’ed on some e-mails about the deal. Or, that he was somehow being paid by Boeing.

This is nothing more than shameful character assassination. General Handy was not in the procurement chain for the lease deal. Of course, as TRANSCOM Commander, he received updates and was asked his view on tankers, but none of these messages gave indications that someone in the procurement chain was manipulating the cost. Also, Gen. Handy was not paid any money by Boeing for his article; we doubt Human Events even paid him. (The last person we know who did get paid by HE had to write two free articles first.)

You don’t see Tanker War Blog attacking General Horner, let alone his character. Because, even though he is a paid KC-30 team consultant and his article has several glaring errors, to do so would be wrong.

We would advise the KC-30 team and their supporters to conduct themselves more honorably in the future.



Other statements by General Handy on tanker issues:

-A March 6th, 2004 piece for Military Aerospace Technology Online directly states that Handy believes the KC-135 fleet should be replaced before the KC-10’s.

“A reliable air refueling capability is essential to the defense of our nation.

While the KC-10 is still a very viable aircraft, our KC-135 fleet averages over 43 years old, and the oldest KC-135E models have a variety of problems, especially with corrosion in critical areas...”

-Additionally, in the same 2004 interview, Handy proposes his solution to the tanker dilemma. For him, the Boeing 767 is the only answer:

“…We have a validated requirement for more tankers, and if you look at the challenge, the best option we have is the proposed KC-767 lease/purchase. That is the near-term solution to a long-term challenge…”

-At a February 13, 2004 speech at the Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Handy expresses his extreme concern over the status of the E-model of the KC-135:

“…Right now, I would like to retire every single KC-135E model as soon as we could make that happen. Get them out of the fleet.”

-In his September 25, 2001 advance policy questions for nomination as Commander in Chief of Transportation Command, Gen. Handy’s prepared statements demonstrates his belief in the need for upgrading the ailing KC-135 fleet:

“Upgrade of our C-5 and KC-135 fleets…are all key pillars of this modernization program.”

-At a March 10, 2004 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Handy devotes part of his testimony to call for a “replacement tanker” for the KC-135 and alludes to the “proposed KC-767 tanker” as the vehicle through which new technology will be tested.

In Defense of Air Force Procurement

Tanker War Blog has been hard on the Air Force procurement at times, but today we feel we must act as its pro-bono public defender.

Since the scathing decision by the GAO on 18 June, Air Force procurement personnel and their actions have been subjected to a number of vicious attacks in the Court of Public Opinion. Before the final verdict is rendered, we feel there are some facts that must be known.

As counsel we will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Air Force procurement can not be held accountable for the mistakes in the KC-X contract as its state of mind did not allow it to make reasoned analysis. As such, the Air Force's actions on awarding the tanker contract to the KC-30 team were not based on willful malice or negligence, but due instead to diminished capacity and battered service syndrome.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, our client has suffered greatly these past four years and to illustrate this we introduce the following into evidence:

1) In 2004, Congress killed a $23.5-billion Air Force plan to lease and buy 100 modified Boeing 767s as tankers after Darleen Druyun, a former Air Force weapons buyer, admitted to inflating the deal before taking a $250,000-a-year job with Boeing. As a result, Druyun served a nine-month prison sentence for conflict-of-interest violations, and the Air Force reopened the competition.

All the contracts that Ms. Druyan was directly involved with since 1993 were reviewed. The Defense Contract Management Agency examined more than 8,000 pages of information in 407 contracts and identified those contracts that appear to have anomalies in them which warrant further review. As of a result of this review and subsequent protests the Air Force investigated the following programs: NPOESS-Conical Microwave Imager Sensor, C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, Financial Information Resource System(FIRST), C-22 Replacement Program (C-40), 60K Tunner Program Contractor Logistics, KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance, F-16 Mission Training Center, C-40 Lease and Purchase Program, Small Diameter Bomb, C-130 AMP.

It is our argument that the loss of credibility, the subsequent departure of the Sec of the Air Force James G. Roche, and the damaged congressional relationships that occurred as a result of this scandal caused our client to go into a downward spiral. The witch hunt that resulted forced some out merely for exchanging e-mail and opinions on the tanker lease. The scandal also caused a huge back load of work which as we will prove stressed and ,with the addition of a number of other factors, finally broke Air Force procurement.

2) In late 2005 our client became aware that it was destitute and could not successfully modernize its force with its current and projected budget. At that time our client sought a number of ways to alleviate this situation, but was eventually denied all its reasonable attempts to support itself.

Given that our client was under extreme financial stress, it is not unreasonable to say that it was susceptible to any fast talking European salesman who falsely promised to deliver lower life cycle costs.

3) February 24, 2006, The DoD Inspector General begins its investigation into the "Thunder Vision" contract. This investigation played heavily on the Air Force procurement and top uniformed officers for a number of reasons: First, those involved included Gen Mosley, Gen Lichte, and MajGen. Goldfein. (Only MajGen Goldfein was found to be culpable.) Second, the company protesting the award was from Arizona, and some in the Air Force feared that particular congressional members from that state may use the case as leverage. The Federal investigation was declined in May 2007 for insufficient evidence at that time, but could have been reopened if there was high level congressional interest.

4) December 1, 2006 a powerful senator writes to then nominated but unconfirmed SecDef Dr. Gates for a number of changes to the KC-X RFP including: Elimination of WTO language, elimination of Berry Amendment provision, and removal of extensions to ITAR regulations, and the inclusion of evaluation criteria that "measures the capabilities beyond thresholds" that would favor large aircraft platforms.

This is not the first congressional letter our client was subjected to, but all prior letters had been dismissed, and the previous SecDef had protected Air Force procurement from Congressional meddling. With the arrival of Sec Gates, my client lost a key ally and was now left to the devices of powerful "third party" lobbying and congressional interests.

5)October 15 2007 Darleen Druyun's replacement as the Air Force's principal deputy assistant secretary for acquisition, Charles D. Riechers, commits suicide and in a note addressed to the head of Air Force procurement repeatedly apologizes for causing a "doomsday scenario" and regrets that the Air Force procurement unit had come under fresh scrutiny.

Prior to Mr. Riechers being confirmed for his Pentagon post, the Air Force arranged a job for him at a defense contract but he did no work for the firm. The arrangement had been drawing heavy scrutiny from Congress.

Mr. Riechers reportedly worked on the KC-X procurement; his sudden and tragic death left our client in a diminished capacity from which it could not recover.

6) December 19, 2007 a member of Senator John McCain’s staff requested that the DoD IG investigate and advise him on whether the Air Force request for proposal for an aerial tanker replacement contained impediments to competition and whether the request for proposal included capability or operational requirements for aircraft refueling and cargo transport.

During this critical decision time for the KC-X tanker contract it weighed heavily on my client's mind as it seemed as though a preemptive IG investigation was being launched by KC-30 supporters. Under such conditions how could our client be expected to chose any other tanker but the KC-30?

7)Finally, we present exhibit A: TWB's inaugural post which pointed out, contrary to Air Force public statements during the tanker award announcement that, “We owe it to Boeing to give them the first debrief,” Air Force personnel briefed at least one outside defense expert and sought to brief members of congress while trying to delay debriefing Boeing for two weeks.

These actions were taken to seed the story that Boeing had lost decisively and to make public and congressional opinion go against a possible Boeing protest. This shameful tactic did work in the media and continued to generate numerous stories that Boeing lost decisively as see here, here, and here; until the GAO showed how poorly the contract was handled.

Ladies and gentlemen, we propose to you that our client knew that its duplicity and leaked misinformation would eventually be uncovered. In fact, these actions were not done out of malice but should be viewed instead as a cry for help.

So, as counsel to Air Force procurement we believe we have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that our client, was at the time of selction, in such a state of mind that it can not be held accountable for its actions. We humbly ask the jury in the Court of Public Opinion to please forgive our client, allow it to rebid the tanker contract, and choose the right tanker for the mission; the KC-767.

Further, we ask that our client's procurement budget be fully funded to meet its mission needs for the F-22, C-17, C-130J, FSF, and the KC-X.

Lastly, your honor we ask that you issue a restraining order against the KC-30 supporters whose constant harassment has so battered the service and left it in its current state of diminished capacity.

In closing, the defense rests in this case, but the Air Force's defense of our nation can never rest. As such, you must exonerate our client and protect it against those seeking to force the KC-30 on it.

Tanker War Blog, Esq.

EADS's Tanker: American as Apple Strudel

Like politicians running for public office, the KC-30's nationality seems to change with what ever constituency it is pandering to at the moment.

In case you missed it, last month EADS won an in-name-only competition to lease 14 tankers to the British Air Force for $26 billion dollars. (We will save our commentary for later on how crazy this price is even if it does include infrastructure, training and maintenance services. BTW: In the US we are buying 179 of them for $35 billion. Talk about king of all lease rip offs!)

The interesting thing is that when the British government names the contractors working on the tankers, which we are told are near identical to those the US Air Force wants to buy, Northrop Grumman is not mentioned:

The contract,...was handed to AirTanker Ltd, a consortium led by Franco-German group EADS which includes Cobham, Rolls-Royce and VT Group of Britain as well as Thales of France, the government said.

But some how that same plane is then marketed as America's tanker and has Northrop Grumman listed as the prime contractor here in the good old USA. As we have said on other occasions, "we couldn't make this up if we tried."

We at Tanker War Blog refuse to suspend our disbelief on the nationality of the KC-30, especially when the first of tanker scheduled to be deliver as part of the contract is currently sitting in a hanger in Germany just waiting for the resolution of Boeing's protest. (See photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman above.)

Any nominations for this first EADS tanker delivered to the US be named "The Spirit of Mobile"? It might be fitting given all the phantom Alabama jobs it is supposedly creating.